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Henry More and Nicolas Malebranche’s Critiques of Spinoza 
 
Jasper Reid 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
 It is something of a truism to observe that Spinoza’s philosophy was 
controversial in his own time. Early-modern authors who presented critiques of some 
part of his system or other included: Noël Aubert de Versé, Pierre Bayle, Samuel 
Clarke, François Fénelon, Heinrich Horch, Isaac Jacquelot, Petrus Jens, Christian 
Kortholt, François Lamy, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Pierre Poiret, Pierre-Sylvain 
Regis, Lambert van Velthuysen, Christoph Wittich, and more besides. The present 
article, however, will be limiting itself to just two of Spinoza’s other early critics: 
Henry More and Nicolas Malebranche. Moreover, even there, it will be limiting itself 
to their respective stances in relation to just one detail within Spinoza’s overall 
metaphysical system, namely the position that he set out in the scholium to 
proposition 15 of part one of the Ethics. 
 There, Spinoza sought to explain how extended substance could present itself 
to the mind in two ostensibly incompatible ways, depending on how the mind came at 
it, whether intellectually conceiving of it as extended substance or alternatively 
representing the modes of this substance in the imagination. Conceiving of it in the 
former way, the mind would discover it to be indivisible, infinite, ungenerated, 
incorruptible and divine. Apprehending it in the latter way, it would discover it to be 
divisible, finite, generated and corruptible. Now, in their own respective metaphysical 
systems, both More and Malebranche also embraced a somewhat similar distinction 
between two kinds of extension, indivisible and divisible, infinite and finite, etc. (This 
is something of an over-simplification in Malebranche’s case: but the point will be 
developed with greater precision in Section II below). However, for both of them, 
these really did need to be two kinds of extension. No single thing, they felt, could be 
both indivisible and divisible in itself: those attributes really were contradictory. But 
they also both recognised that Spinoza was postulating only a single extended 
substance. So then the question was: if that substance could not be both indivisible 
and divisible, then which one was it? With which of their own two alternative kinds of 
extension was his single kind to be associated? If two different mental faculties were 
suggesting opposite natures for Spinoza’s extension, and if it could not actually 
possess both of these natures in itself, then one or other faculty must have been giving 
a false impression of how it really was: but which one? The interesting thing about the 
responses that More and Malebranche made to Spinoza is that, on these questions, 
they diverged. More felt that Spinoza’s extended substance should be associated with 
his own conception of divisible matter. Malebranche, by contrast, felt that it should 
instead be associated with his own conception of indivisible ‘intelligible extension’. 
The present article will explore this divergence, and consider it in relation to other 
divergences elsewhere in More and Malebranche’s respective philosophical systems, 
specifically in their views on epistemology.  
 Just for the sake of orientation, I shall begin with a few dates. Spinoza lived 
from 1632 to 1677, in a series of Dutch towns and cities (Amsterdam, Rijnsburg, 
Voorburg, The Hague). He published his Theological-Political Treatise in 1670, 
which already brought down much controversy upon him; and then, in 1677, this was 
followed by his no-less-controversial Posthumous Works, which presented the Ethics 
for the first time, alongside various letters and other writings. 
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 As for Henry More, he lived from 1614 to 1687. He came originally from 
Lincolnshire, but was based in Cambridge from 1631 onwards, first as a student and 
then as a fellow. He published the first in a long line of philosophical works in 1642; 
and, in the 1670s, he was among Spinoza’s earliest critics. As early as 1671, just a 
year after its anonymous publication, More was already sufficiently clued up to 
inform Robert Boyle ‘that Spinosa, a Jew first, after a Cartesian, and now an atheist, 
is supposed the author of Theologico-Politicus’.1 His full critique of that work, Ad 
V.C. epistola altera, was prepared in 1677, the same year that Spinoza’s Posthumous 
Works appeared; and, within a year, More had written a second critique against the 
latter, Demonstrationis duarum propositionum… confutatio (henceforth, his 
‘Confutation’). These two tracts were then published side by side in More’s Opera 
omnia of 1679.2 
 Meanwhile, Nicolas Malebranche lived in Paris from 1638 to 1715. His public 
philosophical career did not start until just before Spinoza’s death, with The Search 
after Truth in 1674–75; but he was highly active on the philosophical scene thereafter. 
He would presumably have known of More through the latter’s published 1648–49 
correspondence with Descartes, but he makes no actual mention even of this, and he 
certainly shows no sign of awareness of More’s own more original works or his 
writings against Spinoza. (More, for his part, shows no sign of awareness of 
Malebranche’s work either. He did read numerous works of other Cartesians of the 
period, but only in Latin. Malebranche worked exclusively in French, and his Search 
did not appear in Latin translation until 1685, after all of More’s own major works 
had already appeared and only shortly before he died). As for Spinoza, and his Ethics 
in particular, Malebranche first started to discuss him in the mid-1680s (albeit only 
briefly), in the ninth of his Méditations chrétiennes et métaphysiques (1683), and in 
the polemical exchange with Antoine Arnauld that followed over the next couple of 
years. We will be looking at these passages below. He also made a couple of passing 
references to Spinoza in his Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion (1688),3 and in 
his final book, Réflexions sur la prémotion physique (1715)4; and (being inclined to 
associate Chinese philosophy with Spinozism), he further seems to have had an eye 
on Spinoza in his Entretien d’un philosophe chrétien, et d’un philosophe chinois and 
surrounding documents.5 But his fullest discussion of Spinoza and Spinozism is to be 
found not in his public writings, but in the correspondence he had at the end of his life 
with Dortous de Mairan. 
 The young Mairan (1678–1771) engaged the elderly and increasingly frail 
Malebranche in a series of four letters in each direction, from Mairan’s first, dated 17 
September 1713, to Malebranche’s last, dated 6 September 1714, which was almost 
the very last (extant) letter he wrote to anyone, prior to his final sickness and death the 
following year.6 Now, Mairan could not really be called a card-carrying Spinozist. He 
told Malebranche, apparently quite sincerely, that he was deeply troubled by the 
consequences of Spinoza’s principles; and yet, try as he might, he could not put his 
finger on any actual flaws in Spinoza’s arguments.7 In addition, he felt that 
Malebranche’s own position was not so very far from Spinoza’s. And so he sought to 
explore these arguments, and these apparent similarities, directly with Malebranche 
himself. In his first reply to Mairan, written during a sojourn in the countryside, 
Malebranche noted that he did not have a copy of Spinoza’s book to hand, but that he 
had ‘read a part of it some time ago’, but had become ‘soon disgusted, not only by the 
horrifying consequences, but by the falsity of the author’s alleged demonstrations’.8 
And then, and over his subsequent replies, he proceeded to identify Spinoza’s errors 
as he saw them, and to explain how his metaphysical system differed from Spinoza’s. 
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 Malebranche’s focus in these letters, and More’s focus in his Confutation (for 
I shall here be disregarding More’s other anti-Spinozist text, the Epistola on the 
Theological-Political Treatise) was squarely on the first part of the Ethics. 
Malebranche, for his part, was generally content to write in general terms about 
certain themes and consequences of Spinoza’s position in relation to his own, rather 
than making direct reference to particular passages in the text (aside from some of 
Spinoza’s definitions). But those themes were all ones that arose directly out of that 
first part of the book. There was no discussion of Spinoza’s theory of the emotions, 
for instance, or of the prospect of liberation from human bondage, or of any of the 
other things that got addressed in the four subsequent parts. As for More, he did cite 
and quote several specific propositions, axioms and definitions throughout his 
Confutation; and, towards the end of this work, he did start to make a few critical 
remarks on issues that came up towards the end of the Ethics itself, such as Spinoza’s 
idiosyncratic conception of the immortality of the soul and the intellectual love of 
God. But a good four fifths of More’s discussion were devoted to Spinoza’s position 
as laid out in just the first fifth of the Ethics and in associated letters. 
 I am going to work on the assumption that the reader of the present article will 
already have a fair grasp on what Spinoza actually says in this part, so I shall not 
rehearse it in any great detail here. Still, for the sake of background, a quick summary, 
plus a closer look at the crucial scholium to proposition 15, might be in order. 
 The main result of part one of the Ethics is that there exists only one 
substance, which Spinoza calls ‘God’, or sometimes ‘nature’. Implicit in this part, and 
explicit in the first two propositions of part two, is that God is essentially extended 
and thinking. The things that we regard as ordinary physical objects are really just 
modes of this substance, considered under the attribute of extension; and the things 
that we regard as individual minds and ideas are modes of the same substance, now 
considered under the attribute of thought. (In what follows, it will be the extended 
aspect of this substance that will concern us, as opposed to the thinking side of 
things). However, Spinoza also maintains that this one divine substance is infinite, 
eternal, ungenerated, incorruptible and indivisible. And yet surely extended things are 
finite, temporal, generated, corruptible, and above all divisible. Spinoza tells us in 
proposition 12: ‘No attribute of substance can be truly conceived from which it would 
follow that substance can be divided’. But extension seems to be precisely such an 
attribute. Even if we leave aside the tricky question of whether physical objects are 
infinitely divisible, or else divisible only down as far as the level of atoms, how can 
anyone seriously deny that they are divisible; and, moreover, that are so by virtue of 
being extended? But then how can these divisible beings all exist in God (as Spinoza 
tells us in proposition 15: ‘Whatsoever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be 
conceived without God’), without conferring their divisibility onto him? 
 In the scholium to this proposition, Spinoza endeavours to ease this tension, 
and to show how the apparent divisibility of bodies can be reconciled with the 
indivisibility of the substance in which they modally inhere. After presenting a few 
other arguments concerning the infinity/finitude of corporeal substance, he writes: 
 
If I am now asked why we have this natural inclination to divide quantity, I 
reply that we conceive quantity in two ways, to wit, abstractly, or 
superficially—in other words, as represented in the imagination—or as 
substance, which we do only through the intellect. If therefore we consider 
quantity insofar as we represent it in the imagination—and this is what we 
more frequently and readily do—we find it to be finite, divisible, and made up 
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of parts. But if we consider it intellectually and conceive it insofar as it is 
substance—and this is very difficult—then it will be found to be infinite, one, 
and indivisible, as we have already sufficiently proved…. For example, we 
conceive water to be divisible and to have separate parts insofar as it is water, 
but not insofar as it is material substance. In this latter respect it is not capable 
of separation or division. Furthermore, water, qua water, comes into existence 
and goes out of existence; but qua substance it does not come into existence 
nor go out of existence.9  
 
Later on, in the second half of part two, Spinoza will be addressing epistemological 
issues, and he there distinguishes between various different kinds of perception or 
knowledge. In particular, he sharply separates the imagination, together with the 
sensual perception in which it is grounded, from the mind’s higher faculties of reason 
and intuition.10 Imagination, he observes, is the only cause of falsity, while rational 
and intuitive knowledge necessarily has to be true.11 Regardless of the faculty through 
which we apprehend it, the object of the mind’s apprehension will be the same: for 
ultimately there is only one object available for the mind to apprehend at all, namely 
God or nature. But this object could well appear to our minds in very different ways, 
depending on the epistemological route we take to it. Our senses will put us in touch 
with the diverse array of modes that all collectively inhere in (extended) substance, 
while our more intellectual powers will allow us to penetrate to the inner essence of 
that substance as such. As the above scholium makes clear, this array of modes will 
be seen and imagined to be divisible. But, if the thing that we really want to know 
about is the nature of substance as such, such a superficial view will give us a false 
and grossly inadequate conception of that. Since we can intellectually recognise that 
substance is indivisible (as Spinoza just established in proposition 13), that must be 
how it truly is. 
 But enough of Spinoza’s own position, for that is not really the one under 
scrutiny in the present article anyway. My focus is instead on More and 
Malebranche’s interpretations of Spinoza’s position, in the context of their own 
respective systems. So the question is not which conception Spinoza regarded as more 
adequately and truly capturing the nature of extended substance, so much as which 
one they took him to favour. 
 And this is also the reason why I have singled out More and Malebranche in 
particular, as opposed to any of Spinoza’s other numerous early critics, and opted to 
focus on their responses alone. For, when we do look at their own respective systems, 
what we find is that they too proposed distinctions between two alternative 
conceptions of extension, the one divisible and the other indivisible, the one finite and 
the other infinite, and so forth. It is this that adds a special level of interest to their 
critiques of Spinoza. 
 For suppose, first of all, that you are just a run-of-the-mill Cartesian, 
somebody who believes that extension is the essence of matter, and that there can be 
nothing extended besides matter. Of course, good Cartesian that you are, you do also 
believe in immaterial substances in addition to this: the point is merely that you do not 
believe that those other substances are extended. You now come across Spinoza. 
Observing his claim that there exists an extended substance, you will surely conclude 
he must be talking about matter. For what else could he be talking about? As far as 
you are concerned, its extension will entail its materiality. Moreover, having already 
satisfied yourself that extension also entails divisibility, you might feel further 
vindicated in your interpretation when you come across his admission that extended 
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substance (or, at any rate, the modes thereof) can indeed be imagined as divisible. 
And you will not allow that anything can truly be both divisible and indivisible, 
because those are contradictory properties. So, when he additionally tries to maintain 
that extended substance can appear to the intellect as indivisible, you might simply 
dismiss this alleged intelligible indivisibility as merely an appearance; or perhaps a 
mistake or a deliberate subterfuge on the author’s part; or at best a purely extrinsic 
feature that does not reflect the way the thing really is in itself. But then, observing 
that Spinoza is not only saying that such an extended substance exists, but is in fact 
going further by saying that no other substances exist besides this one, you are 
naturally going to conclude that he is simply a materialist. His ontology rightly 
includes material substance, but it wrongly excludes immaterial substances. Spinoza 
was certainly widely read as a materialist in his own time, and it seems plausible that 
thoughts along these lines may have been instrumental in leading many of his 
critics—even non-Cartesians—to that conclusion. 
 But now suppose that, in your own metaphysical system, you are inclined to 
countenance two really distinct kinds of extension, divisible and indivisible—indeed, 
material and immaterial—each of them close to one or other of Spinoza’s two 
different takes on his own one extended substance. For this is what both More and 
Malebranche did. And therefore they both faced a choice. They were well aware that 
Spinoza believed that there was only one extended substance: few tenets were more 
central to Spinoza’s system, and more prominent in his writings, than that. And they 
were not about to identify his extension with both of their own, precisely because they 
refused to identify those with one another. So which one would they pick? Would 
they treat sensible/imaginable divisibility, finiteness, generation and corruptibility as 
more accurately capturing the true, intrinsic nature of Spinoza’s substance? Or would 
they favour intelligible indivisibility, infinity, and divinely eternal immutability? The 
intriguing answer is that, when faced with this choice over how to interpret Spinoza, 
More and Malebranche opted to go in precisely opposite directions. The chief purpose 
of this article is to explore that divergence. 
 We will come to the divergence itself in Section III below. But first we will 
need to look in more detail at precisely how More and Malebranche conceived their 
two alternative kinds of extension; for there are important differences between them 
here too. I shall begin with a summary of More’s position, and then discuss 
Malebranche’s, before returning to tackle their respective critiques of Spinoza head-
on. 
 
II TWO KINDS OF EXTENSION IN MORE AND MALEBRANCHE 
 
 More was quite adamant that there were indeed two quite different kinds of 
extension. Whereas Spinoza tried to make these merely different apprehensions of one 
and the same essence, More treated these two extensions as attributes of really distinct 
substances.12 First, there were bodies, each of which was a really distinct material 
substance in its own right. Their extensions were knowable through the senses. They 
were physically divisible (or, to use More’s preferred expression, ‘discerpible’), as 
well as being impenetrable in the sense that it was strictly impossible that two bodies 
should exist in the same place at the same time. This was, indeed, his definition of 
what it meant to be a body: it was to be ‘A Substance impenetrable and discerpible’.13  
 Bodies, for More, were also finite. This was certainly true of particular, 
individual bodies, each one of which would be bounded by some definite figure of 
some definite size. As for the sum total of all of the matter in the universe, More went 
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back and forth over the course of his career, on the question of whether that was finite 
or infinite in extent. But, at the time when he was writing his Confutation of Spinoza, 
he was satisfied that this too was finite. In that very work itself, he wrote of the 
universal matter that it was ‘indeed not an infinite being, with respect to extension’, 
and he referred his reader back to his Enchiridion metaphysicum (1671) for a 
demonstration of this.14 
 Finally, bodies were generated and corruptible. Through motion, various 
particles could come together to constitute a certain body of some brand new kind; 
which could then disintegrate, and cease to exist in that form, as those particles 
subsequently dispersed. Admittedly, in a natural process of generation and corruption 
like this, the underlying matter would still endure throughout: but More additionally 
believed that this underlying matter itself needed to have been initially created out of 
nothing by an omnipotent God, and that the same omnipotent power could (if God 
should will it) annihilate it too. 
 Second, More then postulated another extension, applicable to spiritual 
substances, which he explicitly described as immaterial. Such an extension played a 
variety of roles in More’s system. For instance, finite instances of it would pertain to 
created spirits such as the human soul. But the clearest example of this immaterial 
kind of extension is the infinite one that he ascribed to space. 
 More’s theory of space was, in some respects, a reaction against Descartes’ 
position. Descartes, for his part, had held that there was no real distinction between a 
body and its space (or ‘internal place’). When we regarded a certain extension as 
something particular, we would thereby be thinking about an individual body. 
Alternatively, when we regarded that extension as something generic, attending solely 
to its size, shape and position, we would be thinking about the space that the body 
occupied. But the object of our thought really would be one and the same extension 
either way, distinguished merely conceptually. Consequently, Descartes felt that it 
was strictly impossible for there ever to be such a thing as an empty space. The 
extension that constituted such a space, allegedly devoid of body, would also be 
constituting a body in that space.15 
 But More, as we have just observed, preferred to define the essence of body 
not in terms of extension as such, but rather in terms of divisibility (‘discerpibility’) 
and impenetrability. Consequently, the way was clear for him to postulate another 
kind of extension, really distinct from the corporeal kind, one that might be indivisible 
and penetrable. And so he did. As far as More was concerned, this was precisely the 
nature of the space in which a body inhered. More had various reasons for thinking 
that such a space was going to need to be really distinct from the bodies it housed: not 
least the fact that, unlike Descartes, he saw no contradiction in the supposition that 
such a space might indeed be entirely devoid of body. As it happens, More did believe 
that the natural world was actually a plenum: but he also believed that it should be 
possible for God, by his omnipotence, to produce a vacuum if he wished. It was just 
that this was not the sort of thing that God, in his fecundity, would ever wish to do.16 
And the mere fact that empty space was possible was sufficient to entail that the 
distinction between space and body needed to be more than just a matter of two 
different ways of conceiving one and the same extension. 
 More’s space was insensible and, consequently, it could not really be pictured 
in the imagination either: ‘the Notion of an Incorporeal Substance’, he wrote, ‘is so 
subtile and refined, that it leaving little or no impression on the Phancy, its 
representation is merely supported by the free power of Reason’.17 As for its 
indivisibility, More’s position was that, although we could focus our intellectual 
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attention on some particular region of space, this was really just a partial 
consideration of the whole. There was only a distinction of reason between the whole 
and the part on which we were opting to focus. The object of our thought would be 
the same in each case, and the difference lay merely in the adequacy (or otherwise) of 
our conception of it. Consequently, it would be a strict impossibility for even an 
omnipotent God actually to separate this region from the remainder—the very same 
kind of impossibility, as it happens, that Descartes had found in the notion of a space 
without a body. And More felt that it was precisely because space was penetrable that 
it could admit bodies into its own dimensions, and thereby supply them with their 
places, despite remaining really distinct from them. 
 Even if the corporeal universe was finite, More’s space was definitely 
supposed to be infinite. It would extend endlessly beyond the world’s outermost 
boundary in all directions, and it would certainly be void out there, even if there 
happened to be a plenum within. And because More felt that space was perfectly 
immutable, its various parts immobile, it was not subject to natural processes of 
generation and corruption as bodies were. Indeed, More went further: it was not even 
created or annihilable by God. And further still: space itself was positively divine. 
God could not annihilate, diminish, or in any way change space, any more than he 
could annihilate, diminish or change any of his other perfections (such as omniscience 
or omnipotence), for ultimately space was just another such perfection. In a famous 
passage from the Enchiridion metaphysicum, More listed some of the properties that 
applied both to space and to God, in order to draw the conclusion that—given that 
they had just so much in common—they could not be really distinct at all: ‘Such as 
one, simple, immobile, eternal, complete, independent, existing from itself, subsisting 
by itself, incorruptible, necessary, immense, uncreated, uncircumscribed, 
incomprehensible, omnipresent, incorporeal, permeating and encompassing 
everything, Being by essence, Being by act, pure Act. There are not less than twenty 
titles by which the divine numen should be designated, which most aptly suit this 
infinite internal place which we have demonstrated to be in the universe’.18 Just as a 
finite and created (though indivisible and penetrable) extension would pertain to the 
human soul, so too would an infinite and uncreated (and similarly indivisible and 
penetrable) extension pertain to God himself. God’s own substance permeated the 
universe, thereby constituting the space in which the finite, generated, corruptible, 
divisible and impenetrable extensions of bodies found their places. 
 So much for More: what about Malebranche? In his case, we also find an 
analogous distinction. But it was an importantly different one too: for, when it came 
to the nature of bodies (even if not always on other matters), Malebranche was a 
faithful Cartesian. Unlike More, Malebranche did think that the distinction between a 
body and the space (or internal place) that it occupied was merely a distinction of 
reason. For Malebranche, the essence of matter was defined by extension, as opposed 
to divisibility and impenetrability. Following Descartes, he believed that divisibility 
and impenetrability were direct corollaries of the mere fact of being extended, so that 
the notion of an indivisible and penetrable extension, of a kind that might be ascribed 
to an immaterial space, was ruled out from the start. As far as Malebranche was 
concerned, the only kind of real extension that existed was divisible and impenetrable, 
created and annihilable, and its various individual parts—particular bodies—were 
subject to generation and corruption through the motions of their own really distinct 
component parts. Moreover, those particular bodies were necessarily finite. The 
concept of infinity, Malebranche felt, could only properly be applied to God, and he 
was absolutely explicit in insisting that no created extension could ever be infinite.19 
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Admittedly, Descartes had said much the same thing, and yet Descartes did also 
believe that the corporeal world as a whole was ‘indefinite’, with bodies extending 
outwards in all directions without limit. Malebranche, for his part, was rather cagey 
on the issue of whether the corporeal world as a whole was bounded or not—although 
there is a reason for this, which I shall come to shortly. But, even if the whole 
universe did turn out to be bounded, there would be literally nothing on the other side 
of such a boundary, not even empty space. The boundary would have no ‘other side’ 
at all. 
 Clearly, then, Malebranche was not about to endorse anything akin to the 
incorporeal yet extended space of Henry More—or, perhaps more pertinently, 
anything akin to the space of Pierre Gassendi. Gassendi, for his part, had also 
postulated two kinds of extension, corporeal and spatial; and, unlike in the case of 
More’s work, Malebranche was aware of Gassendi’s. Gassendi had held that God had 
created the corporeal world in some determined region of an incorporeal, indivisible 
and penetrable space. This space was itself uncreated: it pre-existed the world that 
was created within it, and it would still remain even if God was to annihilate that 
world. It was also unbounded: even beyond the outermost parts of the corporeal 
world, space itself would just carry on going forever. Gassendi was content to adopt 
traditional Scholastic terminology in calling this extra-mundane extension ‘imaginary 
space’, but he insisted that this should not be taken to mean that it was something 
dependent on the imagination like a chimera. It meant merely that the conception we 
had of its dimensions was formed in the imagination through an analogy with the 
sensible dimensions of bodies. But, even so, it was a real being in its own right, and 
its own dimensions really were intrinsic to it.20 Admittedly, Gassendi did not adopt 
More’s final manoeuvre, to treat this space as divine; and there were other differences 
between them too (e.g. over whether there were any interstitial vacua within the 
natural world). But, by and large, Gassendi’s theory of space was pretty close to 
More’s. 
 Now, although Malebranche did not mention Gassendi by name on this 
particular occasion, he might well have had him in mind when writing the ninth of his 
Méditations chrétiennes et métaphysiques—which, as already noted, was also the 
place where he first mentioned Spinoza. In §8, Malebranche referred to those who 
‘conceive that the world was created in immense spaces, that these spaces never 
started [to exist], and that not even God could destroy them’. Such an opinion, he 
observed, would lead people to think that matter itself was uncreated and eternal: for, 
after all, what was matter (in his view) but extension, i.e. space? It was in §13 that 
Malebranche would go on to note that ‘the miserable Spinoza judged that creation 
was impossible’.21 
 However, in between those two sections, Malebranche declared that actually 
there were two kinds of extension after all. ‘But you must distinguish two kinds of 
extension’, he wrote in §9, ‘the one intelligible, the other material. Intelligible 
extension is eternal, immense, necessary. It is the immensity of the divine Being. It is 
the intelligible idea of an infinity of possible worlds’.22 Now, this notion of 
‘intelligible extension’ was one that Malebranche had first introduced in 1678, in the 
Tenth Elucidation to The Search after Truth, and it featured prominently in his works 
thereafter. His proper conception of it will be explicated in a moment: but, just on the 
face of it, there seems to be a problem here. When Malebranche says that intelligible 
extension is eternal, immense and necessary, does this not conflict with everything 
that he has just been saying, even in this very discussion? Surely this so-called second 
kind of extension, distinct from material extension, will simply reduce to the space of 
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Gassendi or More, contradicting Malebranche’s explicit rejection of such conceptions 
of eternal and immaterial spaces. 
 Antoine Arnauld, for his part, certainly thought so. The remark just quoted 
comes from the first edition of this work, published in 1683, and Malebranche would 
be slightly modifying it when it came time for him to produce a second. For, in the 
interim, Arnauld raised certain objections against this discussion. In his Défense 
contre la Réponse au livre Des vrayes et des fausse idées (1684), the latest instalment 
in his voluminous and far-reaching polemical exchange with Malebranche, Arnauld 
accused Malebranche’s purported distinction, between material and intelligible 
extension, of inadvertently boiling down the very same distinction between material 
and spatial extension that Malebranche himself found so objectionable in Gassendi. 
He complained that what Malebranche was saying here about this supposed infinite 
intelligible extension entailed: 
 
that it is a true extension, a formal extension, which is not different from the 
extension that you call material, except because the first is necessary, 
immense, eternal, whereas the other cannot be so; for [the other] is bounded, 
and was created in time: unless this further difference should be added, that 
the first, which you call intelligible, is penetrable and immobile, whereas the 
other is impenetrable and mobile. And thus I do not at all see that this infinite 
intelligible extension, which you say is the immensity of the divine being, is 
different from the space of the Gassendists, for they also say that there is a 
necessary, immense, eternal, penetrable and immobile extension; though they 
do not say that it is God.23 
 
 However, Arnauld also recognised that Malebranche had had Spinoza in view 
in this passage, at least as much as he did Gassendi. Arnauld returned to it later on in 
this same Défense, and he now observed: ‘To understand this passage well, it is good 
to note that he here had it in view to refute Spinoza, who believed that the matter of 
which God made the world was uncreated, and that he is seeking a reason that brought 
that impious person into this error’.24 Arnauld noted Malebranche’s opinion that this 
reason lay in an erroneous belief that there existed an extension that was necessary 
and eternal (such as that of an immense space in which the world was created), 
coupled with a conflation of matter with such a space. But then, when Malebranche 
himself started to distinguish between (to use Malebranche’s own words) ‘two kinds 
of extension’, treating one of these as the necessary and eternal immensity of the 
divine being, Arnauld felt that this so-called ‘intelligible extension’ would still need 
to be regarded as ‘a true and formal extension’ in its own right. Consequently, 
Malebranche’s position would itself just boil down to the very kind of position that he 
was trying to get away from.25 
 In his Trois lettres, published the following year (1685), Malebranche 
responded to the second of these two discussions in Arnauld’s Défense, expressing the 
hope that a careful examination of it might ‘perhaps at the same time serve to 
disabuse the Spinozists, and those who believe that the world is eternal; and ultimately 
perhaps [also] those who imagine that the so-called “imaginary” spaces are the divine 
immensity and the divine substance, in itself or insofar as it is present everywhere, 
even beyond the world’.26 Malebranche explained that he did not believe that the 
thing that he was calling ‘intelligible extension’ was formally extended at all. It was, 
he said, merely ‘the Archetype of bodies, or what there is in God that represents 
bodies’.27 Intelligible extension, he explained, ‘is the divine substance insofar as it is 
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representative of spaces, and not insofar as it is spread through immense spaces…. 
For I believe that God is beyond the world by the actual presence of his substance: but 
I do not believe that he is there in the manner of bodies, I mean, larger in a larger 
space, and smaller in a smaller one’.28 Sure enough, in the second edition of the 
Méditations chrétiennes (1694), Malebranche modified the ‘two kinds of extension’ 
passage, so as to make it now read: ‘But you must distinguish two kinds of extension, 
the one intelligible, the other material. Intelligible extension is eternal, immense, 
necessary. It is the immensity of the divine Being, insofar as it is infinitely 
participable by corporeal creatures, insofar as it is representative of an immense 
matter. It is, in a word, the intelligible idea of an infinity of possible worlds’.29 
 As far as Malebranche was concerned, neither intelligible extension, nor the 
substance of God in which it inhered, could be extended—and therein lay its chief 
difference from More (or Gassendi’s) space. For Malebranche, God’s immensity 
could not be understood in terms of extension, for that would indeed have been 
tantamount to making God corporeal. Rather than being spread out, partly here and 
partly there, Malebranche instead conceived of his God in the more traditional 
Scholastic manner, as being wholly present in each and every part of the corporeal 
world, a very different mode of presence from that which pertained to the bodies 
themselves. However, when God reflected on his own immensity, he recognised that 
this perfection could be imperfectly participated in (or imitated by) his creatures. 
Although no single creature could be present everywhere, still less wholly present 
everywhere, a creature could nevertheless have a less perfect form of presence by 
being finitely extended, i.e. by being corporeal. Since God would only ever act 
wisely, it was necessary that he should have an archetypal idea of anything that he 
was going to create, prior to that act of creation. But such ideas, being themselves 
uncreated, could not be distinct from him, for he was the only uncreated being. As 
Malebranche put it, in the course of the 1678 discussion wherein he had first unveiled 
his theory of intelligible extension, ‘God’s ideas of creatures are, as Saint Thomas 
says, only His essence, insofar as it is participable or imperfectly imitable, for God 
contains every creaturely perfection, though in a divine and infinite way’.30  
 Moreover, God also allowed our own intellects to enter into an illuminating 
union with intelligible extension, i.e. with the divine idea of body in general, thus 
understood as God’s own immensity insofar as it was variously participable by 
creatures. In so doing, God thereby allowed us to discover the very same things 
therein that he had already seen: and the things that he, and we, discovered would be 
all of the possible modes of corporeal creatures. The idea of extension, wrote 
Malebranche, ‘can represent only successive or permanent relations of distance, i.e., 
instances of motion and figure’.31 A body could only imitate God’s immensity in an 
imperfect, limited way. But different limitations in different cases would render one 
body square and another round, one larger and another smaller, one moving and 
another at rest in relation to its neighbours. But then, since it would be these modes—
and, more precisely, the fine configuration and motions of the microscopic particles—
that were determining the physical behaviour and appearance of any given body, we 
could effectively discover all possible bodies in intelligible extension. After all, 
Malebranche regarded a mode as being identical with its own substance, insofar as 
that substance was existing in a certain way: ‘the actual roundness and motion of a 
body are but that body shaped and moved in this or that way’.32 And so we could 
grasp the ideas of all possible created corporeal substances in God. Indeed, 
Malebranche went even further than this. With his theory of ‘vision in God’, he 
explained how this same divine intelligible extension could be the immediate object 
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of our minds, not only in purely intellectual intuition, but also in sensual perception. 
When our apprehension of it was modified by a ‘sensation’, i.e. by some particular 
mode of thought such as a colour, this would signal to us not merely that it was 
possible that a body of a certain kind should exist, but that such a body did actually 
exist, and that it was actually affecting our own bodily sense-organs. 
 It was thus that Malebranche resolved the various ideas of different kinds of 
body into a single idea of extension in general. He did not feel that such particular 
ideas should be regarded as modes of God, or even as modes of the intelligible 
extension that subsisted in God. For Malebranche, modification meant restriction. The 
shape or size, for instance, of a created corporeal substance, signalled not only how 
far it went, but also where it stopped. When a creature was determined into some 
particular form, this meant that it could not simultaneously possess other, contrary 
forms. But Malebranche’s God was necessarily infinite and unrestricted. Indeed, he 
was not even a particular being, but completely universal, ‘being in general’ as 
Malebranche called him. Consequently, he was not a fit subject for modification. 
Immediately prior to the comment quoted above, where Malebranche explained that 
the divine ideas were God’s essence insofar as it was imperfectly participable, he 
observed that these ideas were not modifications of God’s substance, because ‘the 
Infinite Being is incapable of modifications’.33 Rather, these particular ideas were 
merely the ideal and intelligible representations of possible modifications of 
particular finite creatures, and they were all collectively united in one general and 
infinite being. Malebranche wrote: ‘as all particular bodies are composed of a 
common and general extension or matter, and a particular form, so the particular ideas 
of bodies are only made of the general idea of extension, viewed under forms or 
through different intellectual or sensible perceptions’.34 When we—or God—
apprehended intelligible extension as such, we were discovering the general essence 
of matter as such, and could grasp the natures of all possible bodies. When we limited 
our attention to some particular cluster of possible modes—sizes, shapes, motions—as 
represented therein, we would be apprehending the idea of some particular kind of 
body, as defined by those modes. Either way, the immediate object of our mind was 
God’s own essence. It would not be quite right to say that we could see God, for we 
certainly could not grasp God’s essence adequately, and apprehend it as it was 
absolutely. We could only apprehend it insofar as it was imitable by bodies. But, as 
for the bodies themselves, we could not apprehend them directly at all, but only via 
this ideal representation.35 
 Malebranche did not actually believe that it was even possible to demonstrate 
the real existence of the corporeal world. He was satisfied that such a world did 
indeed exist, but that was on the basis of faith. As far as philosophical demonstration 
was concerned, this could at best be used to show that the corporeal world probably 
existed.36 The existence of creatures of any kind was grounded in God’s will, and 
Malebranche sharply distinguished God’s will from his intellect. All that we could 
know with certainty were the eternal and uncreated essences of possible things that 
we apprehended in the latter. To discover what God had actually chosen to create, 
given that we had no direct intuition of God’s volitions themselves, we would need to 
turn instead to the evidence of our senses. But our senses would only give us a 
confused and exceedingly limited grasp on the bodies around us, for the sake of the 
preservation of the union of our own bodies and souls (i.e. so that we did not keep 
bumping into things and injuring ourselves, thereby jeopardising that union). 
Moreover, as the sensations of amputees would suggest, the laws of soul-body union 
would sometimes cause our sensations to lead us to believe that certain bodies existed, 
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when actually they did not exist at all. And this was, incidentally, also the reason why 
(as already noted above) Malebranche was generally quite reluctant to come down 
firmly on the question of whether the corporeal universe as a whole was bounded or 
unbounded. He wrote to Mairan, in the course of the very correspondence that is of 
principal concern in the present article: 
 
the idea of extension is infinite, but its ideatum possibly not. Perhaps it has in 
fact no ideatum. I see immediately only the idea and not the ideatum, and I am 
persuaded that the idea has been for an eternity without ideatum. The idea is 
eternal, infinite, necessary and even efficacious, for it is only the idea that acts 
on minds, that illuminates them and that can make them happy or unhappy. 
But I do not see the ideatum immediately. I do not know except by a kind of 
revelation that there is one.37  
 
 Still, notwithstanding Malebranche’s caution over our route towards certainty 
in the existence of bodies, he was nevertheless satisfied that they did indeed exist. 
And so he drew a distinction between the uncreated intelligible extension in God that 
represented the corporeal world, and the created material extension that constituted 
the corporeal world. We have already seen the principal difference between 
Malebranche’s intelligible extension and More (or Gassendi’s) spatial extension, that 
the former, notwithstanding its representational content, was not actually supposed to 
be extended: ‘God is all that he is everywhere that he is, and he is everywhere. The 
idea of extension or intelligible extension, in itself or according to its absolute reality, 
is not locally extended at all, as I have proved in my first Letter against M. Arnauld’s 
Défense. It is only intelligibly extended, i.e. representative of a formal extension’.38 
And we must never lose sight of this crucial difference between More and 
Malebranche. But, bracketing it for present purposes, Malebranche’s distinction 
between corporeal and intelligible extension really did have quite a lot in common 
with the distinction we already examined in More’s system. 
 For Malebranche, just as for More (and near enough anyone else one could 
care to mention), sensible bodies were divisible, and also impenetrable. Indeed, unlike 
More (who embraced a form of atomism), Malebranche was satisfied that they were 
infinitely divisible. Particular bodies were generated through the convergent motions 
of their component particles, and they were corruptible as those particles subsequently 
came to disperse; and, although the underlying matter itself might endure throughout, 
that did at least need to have been created out of nothing by God in the first place, and 
it could in principle be annihilated again by him. And Malebranche’s bodies were 
finite, at least if we are considering the extension of any particular corporeal 
individual. 
 Meanwhile, intelligible extension was infinite, albeit not in extension (for it 
was not formally extended at all). Rather, its infinity pertained to its inexhaustible 
objective reality. Intelligible extension represented infinitely many possible modes, 
and thereby represented the infinitely many possible extended substances that could 
bear such modes. It was also supposed to be indivisible. It is true that Malebranche 
was content to attribute ‘intelligible parts’ to intelligible extension, or to speak of 
‘intelligible circles’, ‘intelligible squares’, ‘intelligible horses’ or ‘intelligible trees’. 
But, for him, these were merely partial considerations of the one intelligible 
extension, as we focused our intellectual attention on the representations it contained 
of those various possible modes of created extension, or of the ideas of the possible 
beings defined by such modes. The object of our thoughts was one and the same 
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simple thing in every case, and the only difference lay in the adequacy (or otherwise) 
of our conception thereof. Given all this, there was also no possibility that such 
intelligible parts might actually move about in relation to one another; and, 
consequently, there was no possibility of generation or corruption in intelligible 
extension. It was not even a creature, for it needed to be archetypally prior to all 
creation in order to facilitate it. And it was so immutable that not even God himself 
could alter it. Whereas Descartes and some of his followers, equating God’s 
understanding with his will, had allowed him dominion over the eternal truths, 
Malebranche rejected this. For him, such truths subsisted as relations between the 
ideas that collectively constituted the intelligible world of his understanding; and his 
understanding was prior to his will. And, ultimately, the intelligible world was God, 
albeit not as he was absolutely, but insofar as he was imperfectly participable or 
imitable by his creatures.  
 Thus, to the extent that a point as crucial as the non-extendedness of 
Malebranche’s intelligible extension can be set to one side, we can see a close 
structural parallel between the distinctions that he and More were drawing between 
(to use the somewhat loose expression that Malebranche himself was content to adopt 
in the Méditations chrétiennes) ‘two kinds of extension’. One was sensible, divisible, 
finite, generated and corruptible; the other was intelligible, indivisible, infinite, 
ungenerated, incorruptible and, indeed, divine. But then this was also, more or less, 
the same distinction that we saw in the scholium to Spinoza’s proposition 15. When 
we approached Spinoza’s extended substance via the senses or imagination, 
construing it as water (or whatever other particular kind of body it might happen to be 
manifesting itself as), we would find it to be divisible and finite, and that it came into 
and went out of being. When we instead approached it via the intellect, we would find 
it to be indivisible, infinite, and eternally immutable. 
 Now, Malebranche never actually tackled this particular scholium head-on. 
But then, he barely made any direct textual references to Spinoza at all, content 
instead to discuss the latter’s system in much more general terms. (Remember that, in 
some of these discussions, he did not even have a copy of the text to hand, but was 
relying on his memory of its general tenor).39 But More did address it in his 
Confutation, and he criticised it at length.40 I shall come to some of his more specific 
criticisms of Spinoza in what follows. But, fundamentally, both More and 
Malebranche’s attitude was that contradictory properties, such as divisibility and 
indivisibility, could not pertain to one and the same object in itself. As I already noted 
in Section I, they were somewhat unusual for their era—and herein stand out among 
Spinoza’s early critics—by both being prepared to postulate an indivisible extension 
(or quasi-extension) in addition to the familiar divisible one: but they were quite 
adamant that these two extensions really did need to be different. But then they also 
both correctly recognised that Spinoza denied that there were two really distinct kinds 
of extension. Therefore, if at most one of their own alternative conceptions could truly 
define the single extension that he did countenance, it would follow that the other 
kind was simply missing from his ontology. Maybe his one extension might appear in 
these contradictory ways, according to the different ways in which it was apprehended 
by the mind: but at least one of these ways could not adequately reflect the intrinsic 
nature of the mind’s object, or of anything else genuinely real at all. But then the 
question is: if these two conceptions cannot both capture the true, intrinsic nature of 
Spinoza’s extended substance, then which one more adequately does so? The way was 
clear for More to identify Spinoza’s substance either with matter or with space, but 
not with both; and the way was clear for Malebranche to identify it either with matter 
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or with intelligible extension, but not with both. So which one would they pick? 
Would they treat sensible divisibility, finiteness, generation and corruptibility as more 
accurately capturing the true, intrinsic nature of Spinoza’s extended substance, or 
would they instead favour its intelligible indivisibility, infinity, and divinely eternal 
immutability? 
 
III MORE AND MALEBRANCHE’S INTERPRETATIONS OF SPINOZA’S 
THEORY OF EXTENSION 
  
 As far as More was concerned, Spinoza was simply a materialist. More 
observed, early on in his Confutation, that Spinoza was ‘one in whose writings 
Matter, Nature, and God sound the same’.41 At another point in this work, he took a 
sequence of eleven remarks, lifted directly out of Spinoza’s own text, each one 
making some declaration or other about God, and he observed: ‘if you substitute the 
name, matter, or understand that matter is being spoken of, all flow with wonderful 
ease, since otherwise quite hard paradoxes will be seen, and on account of a reason as 
frightful as strange, for, you may be certain he understands by that God matter, and 
not an eternal and omniscient, etc., spirit’.42 In the eleven quoted propositions that 
followed, whenever Spinoza happened to mention God, More would follow this with 
his own bracketed interpolation of ‘i.e. matter’. Thus, for instance: ‘Individual things 
are nothing but the modifications or modes of the attributes of God [i.e. matter], etc. 
Corollary, Prop. 25’.43 Later on, More went further still, and now resorted simply to 
rewriting Spinoza’s text, dropping the word ‘God’ altogether. Thus, Spinoza’s 
fourteenth proposition (‘Besides God, no substance can exist, nor be conceived’) 
became, in More’s hands: ‘Besides matter, no substance can exist, nor be 
conceived’.44 
 For his part, More did not think that the universal matter was either eternal or 
infinite: but he was by no means oblivious to the fact that Spinoza was treating his 
substance as such.45 So did this observation shake his conviction that Spinoza was 
identifying his substance with matter? Not at all. He was still convinced that Spinoza 
was attempting to make such an identification: all that this went to show that he was 
too inept even to do that right. Not only was Spinoza embracing a materialist 
conception of God—which was already bad enough—but his conception of matter 
itself was a false and incoherent one anyway. Or, again, More spotted that, besides 
extension, Spinoza was also treating thought as an attribute of substance. But he just 
took this to mean that Spinoza believed that all material things could think: 
 
If, therefore, properly speaking, Spinoza makes thought an attribute of God, it 
is necessary to ascribe thought to God universally, that is, to the individual 
parts of God, so that lead and stones think.46 
 
To all of which you may add, since he concedes there is no substance besides 
matter in nature, nor can anything besides mode and substance be conceived, 
the human mind, according to Spinoza, is necessarily a mode of some matter, 
which, to the degree that it is more subtle and active, consists of more subtle 
and dispersable particles.47 
 
And, from More’s point of view, this was just one more easily refutable blunder on 
Spinoza’s part. One of the main themes of More’s own philosophical work had 
always been a defence of the immateriality of thinking substances, in opposition to 
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various forms of materialism, such as that of Hobbes. And it was with Hobbes that 
More now associated Spinoza. He saw his objective as being to ‘cut the sinews of the 
Spinozan and Hobbesian cause’.48 
 And so, although More could have opted to associate Spinoza’s extension with 
his own divine spatial extension, he did not do so. Instead, he associated it with his 
own material extension, and he felt that Spinoza’s ontology simply failed to include 
anything properly worthy of the name ‘God’ at all. In the case of Malebranche, by 
contrast, we find precisely the opposite interpretation of Spinoza’s position. Again, 
there were two alternative readings of Spinoza on the table for Malebranche. He could 
equally well have opted to associate it either with his own material extension, or with 
his own divine ‘intelligible extension’. But Malebranche picked the latter. For him, 
the thing that Spinoza was retaining was God, and it was matter that was missing 
from his ontology. 
 Already, in one of his earliest allusions to Spinoza (1685), Malebranche 
observed that ‘the Spinozists confuse the idea of bodies with the bodies themselves’.49 
But then, remember what Malebranche thought the idea of bodies was. It was the 
intelligible extension of the divine substance itself, insofar as its immensity was 
imperfectly imitable or participable by creatures. Admittedly, just to say that Spinoza 
confuses two things with one another does not necessarily entail any particular view 
about which of these is being reduced to the other, or whether perhaps they are simply 
meeting in the middle. But Malebranche returned to the same theme in his 
correspondence with Mairan, almost thirty years later, and there he developed it more 
fully. 
 In his first letter to Mairan, Malebranche wrote of Spinoza as follows: 
 
The chief cause of the errors of that author comes, it appears to me, from the 
fact that he takes the ideas of creatures for the creatures themselves, the ideas 
of bodies for bodies, and that he supposes that one sees them in themselves: a 
gross error, as you know. For, being inwardly convinced that the idea of 
extension is eternal, necessary, and infinite, and further, assuming creation to 
be impossible, he takes for the world or created extension the intelligible 
world that is the immediate object of mind. Thus he confuses God or the 
sovereign Reason that includes the ideas that enlighten our minds with the 
work that those ideas represent.50 
 
Although merely ‘confusing’ one thing with another (‘il confond… avec…’) might not 
determine any kind of priority between the two of them, ‘taking’ one of them for the 
other (‘il prend… pour…’) does suggest that it is supposed to be the former that is the 
genuine object here, and that the latter is being confused with it rather than vice versa. 
The starting point for Malebranche’s Spinoza seems to be the ideas of creatures, the 
ideas of bodies, and the intelligible world in God. So far, so good. But where this 
Spinoza then falls short is in failing to offer up the requisite creatures, bodies and 
extended world that ought to be postulated in addition to these.51 
 Mairan, for his part, certainly seems to have taken Malebranche’s comment in 
this way. In his reply, Mairan wrote: ‘it is clear that your intelligible extension is 
nothing else than the extended substance of which created or material extension, that 
is to say, bodies, color, hardness, etc.—insofar as they affect our senses and our 
imagination—are but simple modes’.52 Remember that Mairan was here defending 
Spinoza’s position (or at least Spinoza’s arguments). Unlike Malebranche (or, for that 
matter, More), he was prepared to concede that perhaps there might indeed be just one 
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common substance, in which all bodies could collectively inhere as modal beings. 
But, as to what this one Spinozistic substance was actually like, he too was inclined to 
associate it with Malebranche’s intelligible extension, rather than associating it with 
matter as Malebranche conceived that. Now, as we have already observed, 
Malebranche did not believe that God (or intelligible extension) was a fit subject for 
modes, on the grounds that he construed a mode as a restriction on a substance, and he 
felt that a necessarily infinite being was incapable of restriction. So Malebranche was 
certainly not going to allow that bodies were to be understood as modes of intelligible 
extension. On the contrary, as he told Mairan in his next letter, they are parts of 
created extension.53 The appearance and physical behaviour of each individual body 
might, indeed, be determined by its modes, rather than by the essence common to all 
bodies. But those modes would need to be getting applied to really distinct 
substances, independent parts of a larger whole, for otherwise a single subject would 
be finding itself modified in several contradictory ways at once, round as well as 
square, moving as well as resting. 
 However, as we have also observed, what Malebranche did believe was that 
all corporeal modes were collectively represented in intelligible extension, thereby 
giving rise to the eternal and immutable ideas of different kinds of bodies. It was 
these ideas that Spinoza—or, in this case, Mairan—was taking for the creatures 
themselves. Continuing the same theme in his next letter, Mairan wrote: 
 
Therefore every body is the modification of intelligible extension, or 
intelligible extension is the subject, the essence or the substance of every 
body. Therefore if intelligible extension is in God, every body is the 
modification of the divine essence, or the divine essence is the substance of all 
bodies. Therefore the terms representative essence, participable by creatures, 
and archetype of bodies, etc., which you apply to it [sc.: to your intelligible 
extension], and which seem to save or soften the conclusion, if they are well 
understood, reduce it to those of substance and essence of bodies.54 
 
Malebranche replied, repeating the same fundamental allegation against Spinoza: 
 
Thus I say again that the author is mistaken, since he takes the idea of the 
world, the intelligible world, or intelligible extension, for the world, ideas for 
the things themselves, and because he believes that the extension of the world 
is eternal, necessary, etc., because intelligible extension is so…. The 
intelligible world is in God and is God himself, for what is in God is, 
substantially, all of God. It [intelligible extension] is not a modality [of God], 
since there is no modality of the infinite, no nothingness in being, nor anything 
that limits infinite being. God is everything that he is, everywhere he is, in 
everything he is, something that the finite mind cannot comprehend. But when 
we think of extension, of the intelligible world, we do not see the essence of 
God according to what it is in itself absolutely. We only see what God saw in 
himself, when he wanted to create the world.55 
 
To this, Mairan expressed bewilderment as to why Malebranche should persist in 
telling him ‘that the author confuses the ideas of things with the things themselves’. 
But he also diagnosed Malebranche’s reason for this, namely the fact that Spinoza 
‘considers the extended substance of which bodies are modifications to be infinite and 
eternal’.56 And this was indeed at the heart of Malebranche’s interpretation of 
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Spinoza. Given that Spinoza treated extension as intelligible, infinite, indivisible, 
eternal and immutable, it would need to be associated with Malebranche’s own 
intelligible extension rather than with his created extension. Leaving aside the 
distinction (important though it is) between modes, which could not pertain to 
intelligible extension, and the ideal representations of modes, which could and did, 
Malebranche understood Spinoza’s position to be that individual bodies should have 
some kind of status like that in relation to intelligible extension. But then he also 
regarded the ideas of individual (kinds of) bodies, as he himself understood them, as 
actually having that kind of status in relation to it. It followed that, when Spinoza 
talked about bodies, the things that he was really talking about were ideas. And, if 
Spinoza was countenancing no other kind of extension besides this ideal, intelligible 
one, then he was not really countenancing any genuinely material, created extension 
at all. Fred Ablondi makes a somewhat similar point, characterising Malebranche’s 
chief objection as being that ‘Spinoza mistakes the ideas of material bodies for the 
bodies themselves, and in doing so, mistakenly claims that material extension is 
eternal, necessary and infinite’. 57 But it would surely be better to say: … eternal, 
necessary, infinite, immutable, intelligible, indivisible, indeed formally unextended, 
and therefore not really material at all, i.e. that Spinoza holds that there is no such 
thing as matter, only ideas. 
 Now, this would be all very well if Spinoza had said simply that extension was 
intelligible, infinite, indivisible, eternal and immutable, and left it at that. But he did 
not leave it at that. What he said was that, insofar as it was intelligible, it would 
present itself to the mind in this way; but he added that it could equally be 
apprehended by the imagination, and its modes would there present themselves as 
finite, divisible, temporal, generated and corruptible. So why did Malebranche simply 
dismiss the latter side of the coin, and focus solely on what the intellect could 
discover of Spinoza’s extended substance? And why did More go the other way, 
focusing instead on that other set of features, leading him to the conclusion that 
Spinoza’s so-called God was really just matter? Why did the former opt to associate 
Spinoza’s extension with his own intelligible extension as opposed to his own 
material extension; and why did the latter associate it with his own material extension 
as opposed to his own spatial extension? 
 To answer this question, we must turn away from Malebranche and More’s 
metaphysical commitments, to look instead at their epistemological views. For what 
the question really boils down to is this: which is the lying faculty, the imagination or 
the intellect? Malebranche and More diverged in the answers they gave to that 
epistemological question, and it is this difference that serves to explain the difference 
in their reactions to Spinoza. 
 
IV THE EPISTEMOLOGIES AT THE HEART OF MORE AND 
MALEBRANCHE’S CRITIQUES 
 
 As we already noted above, Malebranche felt that the only real reason why we 
possess senses at all is to enable us to coordinate our actions in relation to the bodies 
around us, for the sake of the preservation of our own bodies, thereby helping to 
preserve the union of our souls with those bodies. Like Descartes, Malebranche felt 
that, as useful as the senses and imagination might have been in giving us the kind of 
superficial information we would need for those purposes, they were pretty hopeless 
when it came to penetrating into the way things really were in themselves. In order to 
discover the essences of things, and the eternal truths that rested upon them, we would 
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need to detach ourselves from our senses, and follow the natural light of the pure 
intellect instead. 
 Already in the Preface to The Search after Truth, Malebranche declared his 
position. The mind’s union with the body, he wrote, ‘infinitely debases man and is 
today the main cause of all his errors and miseries…. But when a man judges things 
only according to the mind’s pure ideas, when he carefully avoids the noisy confusion 
of creatures, and, when entering into himself, he listens to his sovereign Master with 
his senses and passions silent, it is impossible for him to fall into error’.58 In book one 
of that work, he examined and sought to confront the errors that arose from the 
senses. In book two, he did the same for the imagination. Finally, in book three, he 
arrived at the pure understanding, upon which his own more positive position would 
be resting. ‘The imagination and the senses’, he announced at the start of that book, 
‘are fertile and inexhaustible sources of errors and illusions, but the mind acting by 
itself is not so liable to err’.59 By ‘pure understanding’ (‘the mind acting by itself’), 
Malebranche meant ‘the mind’s faculty of knowing external objects without forming 
corporeal images of them in the brain to represent them. We shall then deal with 
intellectual ideas, by means of which the pure understanding is aware of external 
objects’.60 These intellectual ideas were, of course, in God. Indeed, they were God, 
insofar as his own perfections were imperfectly imitable by—and thereby 
representative of—possible creatures. True enough, Malebranche did believe that the 
same divine ideas were additionally the immediate objects of our minds when we 
sensed things or, for that matter, imagined them.61 But sensation and imagination 
were bodily processes, involving physical traces (‘corporeal images’) in the sense-
organs and brain, in addition to the associated psychological experiences. And what 
this meant was that those psychological experiences themselves were limited, 
restricted by modifications (such as colour) in accordance with the laws of mind-body 
union. It was only through the pure intellect that our minds could separate themselves 
from our bodies, and thereby achieve a pure and unmodified apprehension of the 
divine ideas as they really were. And, by apprehending these ideas, we could 
apprehend truth itself: for Malebranche defined an eternal truth as a relation among 
these ideas, whether a relation of magnitude (in the case of mathematical truths) or a 
relation of perfection (in the case of moral ones).62  
 With this in mind, consider what Malebranche found when he read Spinoza. 
When Spinoza apprehended extension intellectually, he discovered it to be indivisible, 
infinite, ungenerated and incorruptible. That, then, was the truth of the matter. For 
Malebranche, if the intellect found it to be so, then it was so. And then, given these 
features, it was only to be expected that Malebranche would identify the object of 
Spinoza’s mind with the divine idea of extension, i.e. with the indivisible, infinite, 
ungenerated and incorruptible intelligible extension that he (Malebranche) had 
elsewhere theorised. The fact that Spinoza himself regarded this object as divine 
would only have served to reinforce this interpretation for Malebranche. 
 True enough, Spinoza did additionally allow us to apprehend this same object 
through the imagination or senses: but then so too did Malebranche, with his theory of 
vision in God. When Spinoza apprehended extension in this way, it would present 
itself to his mind as something divisible, finite, generated and corruptible. And the 
same was true of Malebranche’s intelligible extension: the modifications in our 
perception of it, when we apprehended it in that way, would give rise to just such a 
perception, as a result of the laws of mind-body union. But that lower perception was 
not to be trusted. It could perhaps give us a confused awareness of the existence of the 
particular created extensions that surrounded us, one that was more or less sufficient 
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for the purposes of preserving our bodies. But that was the most that it could do. It 
certainly could not shed any light on the true, intrinsic nature of the object that our 
minds were actually in contact with. 
 And the difference between Spinoza and Malebranche lay in the fact that the 
former countenanced only this one object, whereas the latter also postulated a second. 
For Malebranche, intelligible extension was merely the ideal and archetypal 
representation of bodies: but at least bodies really did exist for it to be representing. It 
might have been a gross error for us to project sensually-perceived imperfections (like 
divisibility, finiteness or mutability) onto intelligible extension, but at least those 
imperfections did have something to which to attach themselves, namely those created 
bodies themselves. Intelligible extension could represent the various modes and 
limitations of bodies to the mind, but bodies really could possess these modes and 
limitations, intrinsically and in their own right. For Spinoza, by contrast, if we (i) 
refuse to allow that his extended substance could be intrinsically both indivisible and 
divisible (on grounds of contradiction); (ii) hold that it must be indivisible (because 
the pure intellect discovers it to be so, and the intellect is always right); and (iii) 
refuse to allow that anything else exists but this one extended substance, then we will 
be very naturally led to the conclusion that nothing in Spinoza’s ontology was really 
divisible at all. The thing that he was retaining was the archetypal idea of body. The 
things that he was omitting were the bodies themselves. When we apprehended 
infinite and indivisible extension through the senses or imagination, we would be 
getting an impression that purported to be an impression of a finite and divisible 
extension. But it would not really be so, because the immediate object of our minds 
was not really like that in itself, and because it was not even so much as representing 
anything like that, for there was no further object that it could represent.  
  What then of Henry More? Unlike Malebranche, More only rarely and briefly 
engaged in directly epistemological discussions: but we can find a few, and they are 
sufficient to make his epistemological position clear enough. More drew a distinction 
between three cognitive faculties in the soul, which he identified as ‘either the 
Common notions that all men in their wits agree upon, or the Evidence of outward 
Sense, or else a clear and distinct Deduction from these’.63 
 The third of these faculties, deduction, need not detain us, for this could not 
provide the mind with any new data of its own, but was merely there for the purposes 
of articulating, analysing and processing the data we already had from other sources. 
As for the common notions, these had their foundation in innate ideas, which More 
regarded as ‘the natural Furniture of humane Understanding’.64 Since we were all 
equipped with such concepts, independently of experience, we could all grasp the 
truth of certain innate principles, and we would all assent to them on first hearing. 
Malebranche, for his part, had rejected innate ideas in favour of an illuminating union 
with the mind of God himself. From More’s perspective (although Malebranche 
would certainly have resisted the charge, stressing the commonality of such a union 
across all mankind), such an appeal, and such an attempt to rest a philosophical 
system on an ‘inner light’ of this kind, would have amounted to an enthusiastic 
delusion. Having just drawn his tripartite division between common notions, sensation 
and deduction, More continued: ‘Whatever is not agreeable to these three is Fancy, 
which testifies nothing of the Truth or Existence of any thing, and therefore ought not, 
nor cannot be assented to by any but mad-men or fools’.65 
 But the interesting thing about More’s epistemology—and all the most so, 
given his strong Neoplatonist leanings—is the weight he was prepared to place on the 
evidence of the senses in particular. ‘To all sensitive Objects the Soul is an Abrasa 
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Tabula’, he wrote, ‘but for Moral and Intellectual Principles, their Idea’s or Notions 
are essential to the Soul’.66 So More could not really be called an empiricist, given his 
commitment to a system of innate ideas. But the point is that those innate ideas would 
inform us about a quite separate class of principles, and had nothing whatsoever to 
offer when it came to our knowledge of bodies. For that, we were entirely reliant on 
our senses; and, within their own proper domain, our senses were fully autonomous 
and unimpeachable. More made it a fundamental axiom of his system that ‘Whatever 
is clear to any one of these Three Faculties, is to be held undoubtedly true, the other 
having nothing to evidence to the contrary’.67 Now, that is not to say that our senses 
can never lead us into error. We all know perfectly well that they can, in cases of 
optical illusions and the like. But, when the tower in the distance looks round, the 
proper way for us to establish that it is in fact square is not just to close our eyes and 
think really hard about it. An intellectual examination of our innate ideas is not going 
to help us here at all. Rather, what we need to do is get closer and look again, i.e. to 
use these same senses to correct their own mistakes. For, as for the notion that the 
senses might lead us globally into error, right across the board, More had no truck 
with that. He described external-world scepticism, of the First Meditation variety, as 
‘a disease incurable, and a thing rather to be pitied or laugh’d at, than seriously 
opposed’.68 Given that sensation, alongside common notions and deduction, was in 
fact getting characterised by More as one of the three branches of ‘reason’,69 it would 
turn out to be literally irrational for us not to trust the evidence that a careful and 
meticulous use of the senses would provide us with, concerning the reality and the 
nature of sensible things. 
 Now, turning to Spinoza’s extended substance, what do we find? Is it 
sensible? Yes, it is. Of course, Spinoza would say that it is also intelligible: but, that 
suggestion notwithstanding, it is certainly supposed to be the sort of thing that we can 
apprehend through our senses and depict in our imaginations. And, when we do grasp 
it in this way, it reveals itself to be divisible, finite, generated and corruptible. So, if 
whatever is clear to our senses ‘is to be held undoubtedly true’, then Spinoza’s 
substance must be divisible, finite, generated and corruptible. 
 There are indications within More’s Confutation itself, that he had precisely 
this line of argument in mind when tackling Spinoza. Thus, for instance, he wrote of 
Spinoza’s extended substance that, ‘deprived however of daily external senses and 
experience, [he] denies it to be composed of parts’.70 In the very next sentence, More 
observed that, as matter of fact, there was another kind of extension, one that ‘it 
would be madness and delirium to consider as being composed of parts. That is, that 
immobile extension distinct from mobile matter which I have demonstrated in the 
Enchridion Metaphysicum’.71 So, even while his own distinction between divisible 
material extension and indivisible spatial extension was at the forefront of his mind, 
More still opted to identify Spinoza’s substance with the former rather than the latter. 
And his reasons for doing so were (i) because it was supposed to be sensible; (ii) 
because our daily external senses and experience clearly revealed that sensible 
extension was composed of separable parts; and (iii) because our senses were 
autonomous and incontrovertible in whatever testimony they happened to give 
concerning sensible things. Later on, More explicitly addressed Spinoza’s contention 
that something that might appear one way in the imagination could appear in a 
different way in the intellect. Perhaps so: but which of these faculties would be 
judging more rightly of the intrinsic nature of extension? More unequivocally opted 
for the former. ‘And indeed the imagination rightly prophesies of those things which 
the senses have bestowed upon it’, he wrote. ‘Since the entire world is indeed 
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sensible, the imagination philosophizes of the universal matter of the world more 
rightly than the intellect of the most acute Spinoza’.72 (Note the sarcasm, a quality that 
runs throughout More’s Confutation).  
 And thus, when considered against the backdrop of their respective 
epistemological systems, the divergence in More and Malebranche’s reactions to 
Spinoza begins to make perfect sense. If Spinoza’s single extension was presenting 
itself in directly contradictory ways to different faculties of his mind, this went to 
show that one or other faculty could not be showing him its true, intrinsic nature. But 
which one? As far as their own ontological commitments were concerned, both 
Malebranche and More could have gone either way, given that each of them 
countenanced two really distinct kinds of extension (in a loose sense of that last word 
in Malebranche’s case—but then, the expression was his own), and each of these fell 
closely in line with one or other of Spinoza’s two takes on his single extension. But, 
as far Malebranche was concerned, the intellect was always to be trusted over the 
senses and imagination. Consequently, he took Spinoza’s extension to be really 
indivisible, infinite, and eternally immutable, given that the intellect discovered it to 
be so. And therefore he was inclined to associate it with his own intelligible 
extension. For Malebranche, it was the archetypal and divine idea of extension that 
Spinoza was retaining, while created bodies, properly so-called, were simply absent 
from his ontology. Notwithstanding his tendency to treat the idea of extension as if it 
was something corporeal, Malebranche’s Spinoza was in fact denying creation. By 
contrast, More felt that, when it came to sensible things, our best guides were the 
senses themselves. Consequently, he took Spinoza’s extension to be really divisible, 
finite, generated and corruptible, given that it plainly revealed itself to the senses in 
that way. And therefore he was inclined to associate it with his own material 
extension. For More, the thing that was missing from Spinoza’s ontology was space, 
i.e. the immensity of God himself. More’s Spinoza was an atheist. The only thing that 
this Spinoza countenanced was matter.73 
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4 Malebranche 1958–84, vol. 16: 25 (cf. vol. 17-1: 622), and 103. Wherever a text has been published 
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5 See Lai 1985 and Mungello 1980.  
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Malebranche 1995: 59–114. Perhaps the best study of it is Ablondi 1998. 
7 Malebranche 1995: 68–69. Mairan’s own position in relation to Spinozism (but especially as relating 
to the Theological-Political Treatise and to Chinese philosophy, more than to the Ethics and the debate 
with Malebranche) is explored in Rodis-Lewis 1988. 
8 Malebranche 1995: 69. In his second letter, now reinstalled in Paris, he indicated that he had taken the 
opportunity to re-read several passages in Spinoza (op. cit.: 76). 
9 Spinoza 2002: 226–27 (Ethics, Sch. Pr. 15, I). There is also a closely related discussion in Letter 12 
(to Meyer, 20 April 1663), op. cit., 787–91. In that latter discussion, when discussing how we represent 
quantity in the imagination, Spinoza explicitly adds: ‘with the help of the senses’ (789). 
10 Spinoza 2002: 267–68 (Ethics, Sch. 2, Pr. 40, II). See also the related discussion in the Treatise on 
the Emendation of the Intellect, op. cit., especially 7–8. 
11 Spinoza 2002: 268 (Ethics, Pr. 41, II). 
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1, §§21–36; and (iii) Enchiridion metaphysicum (i.e. More 1995), chapters 6–10, 27–28. For discussion 
of More’s position, see: Anderson 1933, chapters 4 and 5; Koyré 1957, chapter 6; Reid 2003a. 
13 More, The Immortality of the Soul, 8, in More 1712. 
14 More  1991, 94, 100. The reference is to More 1995, vol. 1: 84–89. 
15 Descartes, The Principles of Philosophy, part 2, §§10–12, 16–18, in Descartes 1984–91, vol. 1: 227–
28, 229–31. 
16 More discussed the possibility or impossibility of a vacuum with Descartes directly, in their 
correspondence of 1648–1649. More’s side of this correspondence has never been published in a full 
English translation (although Descartes’ side has been, and can be found in the third volume of 
Descartes 1984–91), but the complete correspondence is available in the original Latin in various 
places, not least More 1712. It is also available in a bilingual Latin-French edition: Descartes et al. 
1953. 
17 More, The Immortality of the Soul, 37, in More 1712. 
18 More 1995, vol. 1: 57. 
19 Among many other places that might be cited for remarks to this effect, see Malebranche 1958–84, 
vol. 9: 966–67. 
20 Gassendi 1972: 384–90. 
21 Malebranche 1958–84, vol. 10: 98–99, 101. 
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22 Malebranche 1958–84, vol. 10: 99, here following the text of the first edition: I shall come onto the 
change that Malebranche made in the second edition in just a moment. 
23 Arnauld 1775–83, vol. 38: 402. Even when Malebranche replied to this charge, Arnauld was still not 
happy, and continued to read Malebranche’s distinction between material and intelligible extension in a 
Gassendist way. See especially the eighth of the Nine Letters that Arnauld wrote against the Three 
Letters that Malebranche wrote against the Defence that Arnauld wrote against the Response that 
Malebranche wrote against Arnauld’s first salvo against him, On True and False Ideas: Arnauld 1775–
83, vol. 39: 122–23, 146–47. See also Arnauld’s letter to Nicole of 17 April 1684, as well as Nicole’s 
own letter to Arnauld of 12 April, both reprinted in Malebranche 1958–1984, vol. 18, 304, 308–10. 
24 Arnauld 1775–83, vol. 38: 517. 
25 Arnauld 1775–83, vol. 38: 518. For discussion of these issues, see Gouhier 1948: part 3, chapter 5; 
Koyré 1957: 155–59; Ndiaye 1980; Radner 1978: especially 113–18. 
26 Malebranche 1958–84, vol. 6: 231. 
27 Malebranche 1958–84, vol. 6: 232. 
28 Malebranche 1958–84, vol. 6: 234. 
29 Malebranche 1958–84, vol. 10: 99. 
30 Malebranche 1997b: 625. 
31 Malebranche 1997b: 49. 
32 Malebranche 1997b: 218. 
33 Ibid. See also, in the correspondence with Mairan itself, Malebranche 1995: 85 (Malebranche to 
Mairan, 12 June 1714). 
34 Malebranche 1958–84, vol. 17-1: 283. 
35 For more on all this, see Reid 2003b. 
36 See the Sixth Elucidation to Malebranche 1997b: 568–76. 
37 Malebranche 1995: 104 (Malebranche to Mairan, 6 September 1714). See also Malebranche 1958–
84, vol. 17-1: 286–87; and Radner 1978: 112–13 and 145 n. 90. 
38 Malebranche 1958–84, vol. 9: 954–55, here following the text of the first edition (1704) of this piece 
(Réponse… à la troisième lettre de M. Arnauld). The second edition (1709) inserts a quotation from St 
Augustine, but not one that adds much to the text.  
39 Besides the statement in his first letter to Mairan, that he did not have a copy of Spinoza’s text where 
he was in the country (see n. 8 above), a much earlier letter to François Lami (2 November 1684) also 
alludes to ‘the principles of Spinoza, in so far as I can remember them, for I do not have enough leisure 
to reread that miserable philosopher’s book’. Malebranche 1958–84, vol. 18: 335. 
40 More 1991: 72–77; he also discussed the related passage from the 1663 letter to Meyer (see n. 9 
above), op. cit., 60–61. 
41 More 1991: 69. 
42 More 1991: 77. 
43 Ibid. 
44 More 1991: 97; and see also 100. 
45 More 1991: 77. 
46 More 1991: 72. 
47 More 1991: 118. 
48 More 1991: 101. 
49 Malebranche 1958–84, vol. 6: 232. 
50 Malebranche 1995: 70 (Malebranche to Mairan, 29 September 1713). 
51 One (now rather elderly) study of the correspondence reverses this, giving material extension 
primacy and suggesting that Malebranche was taking Spinoza to have been confusing intelligible 
extension with that rather than vice versa. However, George Getchev’s reversal is based on a 
mistranslation, putting the word ‘for’ in the wrong place. Where Grene has ‘he takes for the world or 
created extension the intelligible world’, Getchev has ‘he takes the world, or created extension, for 
intelligible extension’, for Malebranche’s ‘il prend pour le monde ou l’etendue creée le monde 
intelligible’ (Malebranche 1958–84, vol. 19: 855). (Getchev 1932: 387, and see also 388, 392). 
Consequently, Getchev’s otherwise handy summary of the correspondence should be handled with 
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52 Malebranche 1995: 75 (Mairan to Malebranche, 9 November 1713). 
53 Malebranche 1995: 77 (Malebranche to Mairan, 5 December 1713). 
54 Malebranche 1995: 83–84 (Mairan to Malebranche, 6 May 1714). The bracketed interpolation is the 
editors’. 
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‘We do not see what God saw in himself’. But the French is ‘ne… que’, not ‘ne… pas’ (Malebranche 
1958–84, vol. 19: 883). 
56 Malebranche 1995: 90 (Mairan to Malebranche, 26 August 1714). 
57 Ablondi 1998: 191. 
58 Malebranche 1997b: xxxiii, xxxvii. 
59 Malebranche 1997b: 197. 
60 Malebranche 1997b: 198. 
61 In addition to a theory of vision in God, Malebranche did also subscribe to a theory of imagination in 
God. He wrote that, when we imagine (for instance) a circle, a determinate part of intelligible extension 
‘lightly touches’ the mind (Malebranche 1997a: 17). 
62 See, among many other places, Malebranche 1997a: 61, 142; Malebranche 1997b: 233–35, 433–34, 
489. 
63 More, Enthusiasmus Triumphatus, 38, in More 1712. The same distinction is also drawn in The 
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